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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores Cicero’s treatment of Epicurean philosophy in his De republica, and 
argues against those who think that Cicero’s criticisms of Epicureanism in the work are 
neither serious nor significant. Cicero engages the Epicureans at the beginning, middle, and 
end of the De republica. In the prologue to Book 1 he argues against the Epicurean view 
that one should not take part in politics unless required to, showing why it is a misguided 
and mistaken view; in Book 3 he represents the character Philus praising the Epicurean 
view that justice should be sought solely on the basis of self-interest as the least 
objectionable account of those who defend justice; and in Book 6 Scipio ends his account of 
his dream by almost humorously critiquing the Epicurean view of the soul and the afterlife 
by showing the souls of Epicureans surviving death and suffering punishment for their 
errors. The paper ends by suggesting that Cicero presents Epicurean political thought as a 
serious problem in the De republica for three different reasons: literary, philosophical, and 
personal.  
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Cicero’s acquaintance with Epicureanism was broad and deep. His earliest 
encounter with philosophy was with his Epicurean teacher Phaedrus, and his 
closest friend throughout his life, Atticus, was an Epicurean1. Despite this 
early introduction to the Garden, Cicero had a negative view of many aspects 
                                                 
1 Cicero describes his early study of Epicureanism at Ad Familiares 13.1.2. The possible 
effects on Cicero of his early study of Epicureanism are well explored by S. Maso, Capire e 
dissentire: Cicerone e la filosofia di Epicuro, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 2008: 31-63. 
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of Epicureanism2. He criticized Epicurean views in a number of his speeches, 
letters, and rhetorical and philosophical works, and one of the doctrines of 
Epicurus with which he disagreed most was that the sage, and people in 
general, should not take part in politics, unless necessity compelled them to 
do so. Cicero’s sharpest attacks on Epicurean political theory occur in the De 
republica, but scholars disagree about how much of a threat Cicero thought 
the Epicurean view of politics was when he was writing the De republica3.  In 
this paper I argue that in the De republica Cicero took Epicurean political 
thought as a serious problem, for literary, philosophical, and personal reasons, 
and included his critique of the Epicurean view on participation in politics as 
an important frame for the work as a whole. 
As has often been noted, Cicero begins and ends the De republica with an 
attack on Epicureanism. Although he does not explicitly name his 
philosophical opponents in either place, it is clear that he is aiming at 
Epicurean positions in both places 4 . As the preface opens after the lost 
opening pages at the beginning of the work, we see Cicero arguing against the 
                                                 
2 Modern studies exploring aspects of Cicero’s generally negative views on Epicureanism 
include: G. D’Anna, Alcuni aspetti della polemica antiepicurea di Cicerone, Roma, Edizioni 
dell’ Ateneo, 1965; Maso, Capire e dissentire, cit.; C. Lévy, Cicéron et l’épicurisme: la 
problématique de l’éloge paradoxal, in C. Auvray-Assayas and D. Delattre, Cicéron et 
Philodème: la polémique en philosophie, Paris, Éd. Rue d’Ulm, 2001: 61-75; T. Maslowski, 
“The Chronology of Cicero’s Anti-epicureanism”, Eos 62(1974): 55-78; J. Leonhardt, 
Ciceros Kritik der Philosophenschulen (Zetemata 103) Munich, Beck, 1999. Additional 
bibliography can be found in G. Gawlick and W. Görler, Cicero in “Hellenistische 
Philosophie,” H. Flashar (ed.), Basel, Schwabe, 1994: 1132-1134. 
3  H.M. Howe, “Amafinius, Lucretius, and Cicero”, The American Journal of Philology 
72(1951): 57-62 had suggested that Cicero’s anti-Epicureanism in the opening of the De 
republica was not that serious, while D’Anna, Alcuni aspetti della polemica antiepicurea di 
Cicerone, cit.: 9; E. Andreoni, “Sul contrasto ideologico fra il De republica di Cicerone e il 
poema di Lucrezio”, Storia e lett. Racc. di studi e testi 141-142(1979), and Maslowski, “The 
Chronology of Cicero’s Anti-epicureanism”, cit., all see Cicero as taking the Epicurean 
threat seriously. J. Zetzel (De republica and De rerum natura in P.E. Knox and C. Foss 
(eds.), Style and tradition: studies in honor of Wendell Clausen, Stuttgart, Teubner, 1999: 
230-247) argues that Cicero’s main response to Lucretius is a literary one and is confined 
mostly to the Dream of Scipio. 
4 For the identification of Cicero’s unnamed opponents as Epicureans in the passages in 
Book 1, see the discussion of Andreoni, “Sul contrasto ideologico fra il De republica di 
Cicerone e il poema di Lucrezio”, cit.: 283-285 and Maslowski, “The Chronology of Cicero’s 
Anti-epicureanism”, cit.: 59-60.  
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Epicurean view that one should not take part in politics5, and in Book 6 the 
work ends with the Dream of Scipio, the final lines of which describe the sad 
fate of the souls of Epicureans after death. 
Cicero composed the De republica between 54 and 51 BCE, three years 
after he returned from exile during a busy period of his life. A number of 
other works he wrote between his exile and the time he finished the De 
republica mention or allude to Epicureanism, including the Post Reditum in 
Senatu (14-16), Pro Sestio (21-25), Pro Caelio (40-41), In Pisonem (in many 
sections, including 20, 37, 42-44, 56-61, and 68-72), and De Oratore (3. 62-64). 
A number of scholars had argued that Cicero, even though he mentions 
Epicureanism in these and other works, did not become seriously hostile 
towards Epicureanism until the philosophical works he wrote in 45-43, but 
several scholars6 have shown that Cicero’s comments on Epicureanism in his 
works before the De republica are more negative than others previously 
thought.   
I think this is true, but I also think we can see a difference in the way he 
treats Epicureanism in these earlier works of the 50s from the way he treats it 
in the De republica. Cicero expresses a generally negative view of 
Epicureanism in these earlier writings, but in none of the works is 
Epicureanism his direct target: in the Post Reditum in Senatu in 57 BCE, 
Cicero discusses Epicureanism briefly to attack Lucius Calpurnius Piso 
Caesoninus and portray him as someone who does not understand 
Epicureanism and uses it as a cover for shameful living; in the Pro Sestio in 56 
BCE, Cicero again discusses Epicureanism as part of his continued attack on 
Piso, and again portrays him as someone who is attracted to Epicureanism 
for his own vicious purposes without really understanding it; in the Pro Caelio, 
also in 56 BCE, he alludes to Epicureanism briefly as part of his defense of 
Caelius’ behavior; in the In Pisonem in 55 BCE, Cicero writes a sustained 
attack on Piso in which his Epicureanism plays a part, but he claims that 
Piso has wildly misunderstood its major tenets.  Finally, in the De Oratore, 
also written in 55, he alludes to the Epicureans as a school that promotes 
pleasure, and which because of its doctrines is not a philosophy that the 
active orator and politician can embrace. Here is part of the passage from the 
De Oratore (3.63-64): 
                                                 
5  The Epicureans were famous for the dictum “Do not take part in politics” (μὴ 
πολιτεύεσθαι) which Cicero quotes at Ad Atticum 14.20.5. 
6  Including D’Anna, Alcuni aspetti della polemica antiepicurea di Cicerone, cit., and 
Maslowski, “The Chronology of Cicero’s Anti-epicureanism”, cit. 
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Ex illis autem quae remanent, ea philosophia, quae suscepit patrocinium 
voluptatis, etsi cui vera videatur, procul abest tamen ab eo viro, quem 
quaerimus et quem auctorem publici consili et regendae civitatis ducem et 
sententiae atque eloquentiae principem in senatu, in populo, in causis publicis 
esse volumus. Nec ulla tamen ei philosophiae fiet iniuria a nobis; non enim 
repelletur inde, quo adgredi cupiet, sed in hortulis quiescet suis, ubi vult, ubi 
etiam recubans molliter et delicate nos avocat a rostris, a iudiciis, a curia, 
fortasse sapienter, hac praesertim re publica. Verum ego non quaero nunc, 
quae sit philosophia verissima, sed quae oratori coniuncta maxime; qua re 
istos sine ulla contumelia dimittamus; sunt enim et boni viri et, quoniam sibi 
ita videntur, beati; tantumque eos admoneamus, ut illud, etiam si est 
verissimum, tacitum tamen tamquam mysterium teneant, quod negant 
versari in re publica esse sapientis; nam si hoc nobis atque optimo cuique 
persuaserint, non poterunt ipsi esse, id quod maxime cupiunt, otiosi. 
 
From those however who remain, this philosophy, which has undertaken 
the patronage of pleasure, even if it seems true to some, is still far removed 
from that man whom we are seeking. We want that man to be a source of 
public counsel, a leader in governing the state, and first in thought and 
eloquence in the senate, popular assemblies, and public cases. Nevertheless, 
this philosophy will not suffer injury from us, for we will not be removing it 
from a place where it desires to go: it will be resting in its own gardens, where 
it wishes to be. And there, while it reclines softly and luxuriously, it calls us 
away from the rostra, from the courts, from the senate house, perhaps wisely7, 
especially with the republic the way it is. But I am not inquiring now, which 
philosophy is the truest, but which is most closely linked to the orator. Let us 
therefore let these people go without any abuse. For they are good men, and, 
as they seem to themselves, blessed.  Let us only issue a warning to them: 
that even if this thing is very true, let them guard it closely like a holy secret, 
that is, that they say the wise man should not be involved in public affairs (in 
re publica).  For if they persuade us and the best people of this, they 
themselves will not be able to be what they most desire to be: at leisure. 
In light of what follows in the De republica four years later, this is an 
important statement. In it Cicero comes closer to criticizing Epicureanism 
directly than he did in his earlier works after his exile, and seems to be 
                                                 
7 On the phrase “perhaps wisely” (sapienter fortasse) see M.P. Grimal,  L’Épicurisme romain,  
in Actes Du VIIIe Congrès Association Guillaume Budé, Paris, Les Belles Lettres (1969): 
155. 
Epicurean Philosophy in Cicero’s De Republica: Serious Threat or Convenient Foil? 
 
257 
 
preparing the themes of his attack on the views of the Epicurean school in the 
De republica. The major points he makes here in the De Oratore are: (1) the 
Epicurean school does not prepare the orator for full engagement in public 
life; (2) Epicureans, reclining at leisure in their gardens, summon others from 
their public work; (3) we warn them not to tempt others with their doctrine 
that the wise should not be engaged in politics; and (4) their project is 
ultimately self-defeating, because if all good men heeded their call, the state 
would collapse and in the resulting disarray no one would be able to have 
leisure8. 
Turning to the De republica, to what extent is Cicero’s attack on 
Epicurean views essential to his main goals in writing his work on the state? 
At first glance, Cicero’s allusions to the Epicureans seem relatively minor and 
unimportant. He mentions them in the text by name only once9, and the 
references to Epicurean doctrines are confined to three sections of what 
remains of the De republica: in his own voice in the prologue to Book 1; in the 
voice of Philus, when Philus defends injustice in Book 3; and in Scipio’s voice 
at the end of the work in Book 6, in the closing lines of the Dream of Scipio.    
In the prologue of Book I, Cicero levels two major charges against the 
Epicureans.  In 1.1, taking Marcus Cato as an example, Cicero explains why 
good people feel compelled to take part in politics (De republica 1.1): 
M. vero Catoni, homini ignoto et novo, quo omnes, qui isdem rebus studemus, 
quasi exemplari ad industriam virtutemque ducimur, certe licuit Tusculi se in 
otio delectare salubri et propinquo loco. Sed homo demens, ut isti putant, cum 
cogeret eum necessitas nulla, in his undis et tempestatibus ad summam 
senectutem maluit iactari quam in illa tranquillitate atque otio iucundissime 
vivere […] Unum hoc definio, tantam esse necessitatem virtutis generi hominum 
a natura tantumque amorem ad communem salutem defendendam datum, ut ea 
vis omnia blandimenta voluptatis otiique vicerit. 
 
                                                 
8 This last point, that the leisure of Epicureans and others who do not take part in politics 
rests on the efforts of those who do, echoes the similar point that Cicero makes at Pro 
Sestio 138: …patiantur virorum fortium labore se otio suo perfrui (“…let them allow 
themselves to enjoy their own leisure through the hard work of brave men”).  On this 
aspect of Epicurean political thought, see M. Schofield, Epicurean and Stoic Political 
Thought in C.J. Rowe & M. Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman 
Political Thought, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000: 442-443. 
9 Cicero mentions the “Epicureans” (Epicurei) in a fragment (K. Ziegler, M. Tullius Cicero, 
Fasc. 39 De republica, Stuttgart and Leipzig, Teubner, 1992: 6.3) from Favonius Eulogius 
that belongs to Book 6. I discuss this fragment later in the paper. 
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But Marcus Cato, a man unknown and undistinguished in birth, whom all of 
us who pursue the same things take as an exemplar of hard work and virtue – 
certainly he could have enjoyed himself in leisure at Tusculum, a place which is 
agreeable and close by.  But that man – insane, as those people [sc. the 
Epicureans] think – when no necessity was compelling him, preferred to be tossed 
about in these waves and storms until advanced old age rather than to live most 
pleasantly in such tranquility and leisure10 […] this alone I declare, that nature 
has given to the human race so great a necessity of virtue, and so great a love of 
defending the safety of all, that this force has overwhelmed the delights of 
pleasure and leisure. 
 
This passage forms part of Cicero’s discussion in the prologue in which he 
deals with the positions of various philosophical schools and their attitudes to 
participation in political life.  He singles out the Epicureans as the school he 
feels offers the most direct challenge to engagement in politics11 . Taking 
Marcus Cato as an example, Cicero notes that Cato had the choice of 
participating actively in politics, or living a life of pleasure and leisure in 
Tusculum, and chose to engage in politics. Cicero claims that the actions of 
Cato and others, including his own, can be explained by the fact that nature 
has instilled in humans a need to be virtuous and help one another that is 
stronger than the desire for pleasure. The Epicureans fail to acknowledge this 
innate need to be virtuous when they call Cato insane for not staying out of 
politics and for not focusing on his own pleasure. 
 Cicero returns to a similar characterization and criticism of Epicurean 
political doctrines in a second passage in the prologue to Book I (De republica 
1.10): 
 
                                                 
10 As Andreoni (E. Andreoni: Sul contrasto ideologico fra il De republica di Cicerone e il 
poema di Lucrezio (La genesi della società civile), in Storia e lett. Racc. di studi e testi, CXLI 
& CXLII: Studi di poesia latina in onore di Antonio Traglia. Roma, 1979: 284-285) points 
out, the language used by those who criticize Cato is Epicurean, both in the criticism that 
Cato took part in politics “though no necessity compelled him” (compare Seneca’s 
comment at De Otio 3.2 that Epicurus taught the wise man should not take part in politics 
“unless something interrupted him”), and in the metaphorical imagery of the waves and 
storms parallel to imagery that Lucretius employs in the De rerum natura. 
11 The Epicurean doctrine to abstain from taking part in politics was famous.  See M. Erler, 
“Cicero und ‘unorthodoxer’ Epikureismus”, Anregung 38(1992): 313-317, and D. Sedley, 
The Ethics of Brutus and Cassius, in “The Journal of Roman Studies” 87(1997): 45-47 for 
views of first century BCE Epicureans on the topic of political engagement. 
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Illa autem exceptio cui probari tandem potest, quod negant sapientem 
suscepturum ullam rei publicae partem, extra quam si eum tempus et necessitas 
coegerit? quasi vero maior cuiquam necessitas accidere possit, quam accidit nobis; 
in qua quid facere potuissem, nisi tum consul fuissem? Consul autem esse qui 
potui, nisi eum vitae cursum tenuissem a pueritia, per quem equestri loco natus 
pervenirem ad honorem amplissimum? Non igitur potestas est ex tempore, aut 
cum velis, opitulandi rei publicae, quamvis ea prematur periculis, nisi eo loco sis, 
ut tibi id facere liceat. 
 
Who finally can approve of this exception, when they [sc. the Epicureans] 
deny that the wise man will take any part in public affairs (rei publicae), except if 
the times and necessity compel him? As if indeed any greater necessity could fall 
on anyone than what fell on us.  What would I have been able to do in this, if I 
had not then been consul?  But how could I have been consul if I had not 
arranged the course of my life from childhood so that I, born into the equestrian 
class, might reach the highest rank?  For there is no power of helping the state at 
the spur of the moment or whenever you want, however much the state (rei 
publicae) is pressed by dangers, unless you are in the position that allows you to 
do this. 
In this section Cicero picks up on what the Epicureans said about Cato in the 
previous passage, when they criticized Cato for entering politics when there was 
no necessity to do so.  Here Cicero makes the point more personal. Criticizing the 
Epicurean view that one should not enter politics unless forced to do so, Cicero 
takes his own case, and asks how, in a time of national emergency, a Roman who 
had followed Epicurean principles and had stayed out of politics could in fact 
help. As Cicero notes, unless he had been a consul at the time of the Catilinarian 
conspiracy, and before that had undertaken the political career that led to the 
consulship, he would not have been able to save the state.   
The next reference to Epicurean doctrines in the De republica occurs in Book 
3, when Philus is presenting Carneades’ arguments against justice and explaining 
why it is best for a state to be unjust. Philus states (De republica 3.26): 
negant enim sapientem idcirco virum bonum esse, quod eum sua sponte ac 
per se bonitas et iustitia delectet, sed quod vacua metu, cura, sollicitudine, 
periculo vita bonorum virorum sit, contra autem improbis semper aliqui scrupus 
in animis haereat, semper iis ante oculos iudicia et supplicia versentur; nullum 
autem emolumentum esse, nullum iniustitia partum praemium tantum, semper 
ut timeas, semper ut adesse, semper ut impendere aliquam poenam putes, 
damna.... 
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They [sc. the Epicureans] deny that a wise man is a good man because 
goodness and justice delight him automatically or in themselves, but because the 
life of good men is free from fear, care, worry, and danger, while in contrast some 
anxiety always clings to the mind of the wicked, and trials and tortures always 
stand before their eyes.  (They say) that there is no advantage, no reward 
produced by injustice that is so great that you should always be afraid, always 
think that some punishment is always present and hanging over you, losses… 
 
Given the fragmentary nature of Book 3, it is hard to know precisely how 
Philus was employing this reference to Epicurean arguments about why one 
should be just, but there can be no doubt that he is here referring to the 
Epicureans12. It looks like this passage was part of Philus’ argument on behalf of 
injustice, arguing against the Epicureans, who though they argue that justice is 
better than injustice, do so not because they think justice is good in itself, but the 
best way to not be subject to worry and to attain ataraxia. Philus, arguing on 
behalf of the advantages of injustice, seems to regard the Epicurean account of 
justice as the least deceitful position of those who argue on behalf of justice. The 
Epicureans make the mistake of arguing for justice, Philus thinks, but at least 
they argue for justice on the basis of self-interest. 
The final two references to Epicureanism in the De republica come in a rather 
unexpected place. The Dream of Scipio that ends the work presents a view of the 
universe that is in many ways the exact opposite of the Epicurean view. 
Responding to the Myth of Er that ends Plato’s Republic, Cicero has Scipio relate 
a dream he had in which his grandfather Scipio Africanus explains the nature of 
the universe, and especially the place after death of the souls of virtuous 
politicians. We learn that great leaders, after toiling on earth on behalf of justice, 
their countries, and the good of mankind, ascend to the skies to attain their 
eternal reward.   
We hear about the Epicureans at the very beginning and at the very end 
of the Dream of Scipio. The first reference is in a fragment of Book 6 
preserved by Favonius Eulogius. This is the only place in the surviving 
fragments of the De republica where the Epicureans are referred to by name  
(De republica 6.3): 
                                                 
12 See K. Büchner, M. Tullius Cicero De republica. Kommentar, Heidelberg, Carl Winter, 
1984: 299. For the Epicurean doctrine Philus mentions here, see A.A. Long and D. Sedley, 
The Hellenistic Philosophers, Volumes I and II. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1987: sections 21 L2, M, O, P. 
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Imitatione Platonis Cicero De republica scribens locum etiam de Eris Pamphyli 
reditu in vitam, qui ut ait rogo impositus revixisset, multaque de inferis secreta 
narrasset, non fabulosa ut ille assimulatione commentus est, sed sollertis somnii 
rationabili quadam imaginatione composuit, videlicet scite significans haec quae de 
animae immortalitate dicerentur caeloque, <nec> somniantium philosophorum 
esse conmenta, nec fabulas incredibiles quas Epicurei  derident, sed prudentium 
coniecturas. (Fav. Eul. P. 1,5 Holder).13 
 
Cicero, writing about the state in imitation of Plato, also included a 
passage about the return to life of Er the Pamphylian, “who”, as he says, 
“had been placed on a funeral pyre and had come back to life, and had 
narrated many secrets about the underworld”, but he did not contrive it, as 
Plato had, with the likeness of a fable but composed it with a certain 
reasonable imagining of an intelligent dream, in this way cleverly indicating 
that “these things which are said about the immortality of the soul and about 
the heavens are not the fictions of dreaming philosophers nor the 
unbelievable stories what the Epicureans make fun of, but the reasonable 
conjectures of prudent people”. 
 
It is hard to tell exactly where Favonius’ summary leaves off and his 
direct quotation of Cicero’s words from the De republica begins, but most 
scholars accept that Cicero has Scipio, before he relates his dream, refer to the 
criticism that the Epicureans applied to the use of myths like the Myth of Er 
in Plato’s Republic14. Indeed, as E. Kechagia points out15, we are able to 
identify the particular Epicurean Cicero may have had in mind here from 
Macrobius’ Commentary on the Dream of Scipio and Proclus’ Commentary on 
Plato’s Republic. Both Macrobius and Proclus tell us that Colotes had 
specifically criticized the Myth of Er on a number of counts, including the 
implausibility of Er’s resurrection. As Kechagia notes16, “This objection of 
                                                 
13 I have reproduced the text of Ziegler, M. Tullius Cicero, Fasc. 39 De republica, cit.: 125, 
who indicates what seem to be Favonius’ own words in italics, and Cicero’s words in a 
regular font. 
14 On the issue of whether Cicero had Scipio mention the Epicureans by name in this 
passage or not, see K. Büchner (op. cit.) 439 and J. Zetzel, De republica: selections, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995: 14 n. 35.  
15 E. Kechagia, Plutarch Against Colotes: A Lesson in the History of Philosophy, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2011: 68-70. 
16 Kechagia, Plutarch Against Colotes, cit.: 70.  
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Colotes too reflects Epicurean doctrine and more particularly the view about 
the soul, which, according to Epicurus, is not immortal but dissolves into 
atoms and void when human beings die”.  
By having Scipio mention the Epicureans just before he relates his dream, 
Cicero prepares his reader for the final reference to the Epicureans in the final 
section of the dream. The last people that we hear about in the Dream of 
Scipio, and in the De republica as a whole, are not the great rulers who receive 
their eternal reward after death, but another group of people (De republica 
6.29): 
 
Namque eorum animi, qui se corporis voluptatibus dediderunt earumque 
se quasi ministros praebuerunt inpulsuque libidinum voluptatibus 
oboedientium deorum et hominum iura violaverunt, corporibus elapsi circum 
terram ipsam volutantur nec hunc in locum nisi multis exagitati saeculis 
revertuntur. 
 
For the spirits of those who have surrendered themselves to the pleasures 
of the body and have made themselves like servants to them, and who, under 
the influence of passions obedient to pleasures, violate the laws of gods and 
humans, these spirits, once they have escaped their bodies, wallow around the 
earth itself and do not return to this place unless they have been tormented 
for many ages. 
 
Scholars seem right to see a reference here not just to the fate of ordinary 
hedonists, but also to Epicureans, whose service to pleasure Cicero had 
attacked at the opening of the work17. This description certainly does not 
represent Epicurean teachings fairly. Although Epicureans held that the 
highest good was pleasure, they argued (as the passage reporting Philus’ 
words from Book 3 discussed above made clear) that Epicureans should 
always be virtuous and never violate laws because it helped insure their 
complete peace of mind (ataraxia). Cicero has Scipio here maintain what 
many non-Epicureans thought about the Epicureans: that no matter what 
their philosophy taught, once one centered one’s life on pleasure it was 
difficult not to give yourself over to it in destructive ways 18 . What is 
                                                 
17 Zetzel, De republica: selections, cit.: 253. 
18  If this interpretation is correct, it would make this attack on Epicurean hedonism 
similar to the one made in De Finibus 2.1-25 and 69-70.  On Cicero’s misrepresentation of 
Epicurus’ hedonism in this way through his mistranslation of Epicurus Κ.Δ. X in De 
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especially ironic here is that these Epicurean spirits must suffer quite a shock 
after they die. As Epicureans, they would have been certain that their souls 
would not survive after death. Here, Scipio informs us the Epicureans are 
wrong about the nature of the soul. Their souls do not break apart at death, 
but separate from their bodies and live on, to suffer torments for many ages 
here on earth. Indeed, given Cicero’s mention of the Epicurean criticism of 
the Myth of Er at the beginning of the Dream of Scipio, it may be that Cicero 
is replying to Colotes’ criticisms of Plato’s account of the resurrection of Er. If 
Colotes can criticize the idea that Er could die and then be resurrected, in his 
account Cicero can criticize the Epicurean belief that the soul perishes along 
with the body, and show Epicureans who die and must be quite surprised to 
find that they have survived death and face great torments.  
 What, then, do we make of Cicero’s treatment of Epicureanism in these 
passages from the De republica? Cicero does not engage Epicurean views 
continually throughout the work, but the passages in which he does show 
that he is worried about their ethical and political doctrines, indeed worried 
enough to begin and end the work by emphatically rejecting their views.  On 
the Epicurean view, people by nature aim at their own personal pleasure, 
should not risk the great dangers of political life, should only take part in 
politics if absolutely compelled to, should only be virtuous to obtain pleasure, 
and should not worry about what happens after death because the soul will 
perish with the body.  If the Epicurean position is correct, Cicero realizes that 
everything he writes about why good men should go into politics, what the 
best form of government is, what the ideal leader should look like, and indeed 
what the ultimate nature of the cosmos is, would be false illusions. Cicero 
clearly feels he must engage with Epicurean philosophy directly in the De 
republica, and he does so on three levels: the literary, philosophical, and 
personal. 
At the literary level, as a number of scholars have noted, Cicero composed 
the De republica shortly after reading Lucretius’ De rerum natura, and 
features of the De republica show Cicero’s significant attempts to engage the 
literary and philosophic aspects of Lucretius’ poem19. Thanks to a letter 
                                                                                                                                                         
Finibus 1.21, see T. Di Matteo, “Cicerone traduttore di Epicuro”, Paideia 54(1999): 175-
185. See also P. DeLacy, “Cicero’s Invective against Piso”, Transactions of the American 
Philological Association 72(1941): 49-51 on Cicero’s misrepresentation of Epicurus’ doctrine 
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19  Scholars who see Cicero’s treatment of the Epicurean position in De republica as 
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Cicero wrote in February 55 BCE to his brother Quintus (Letters to Quintus 
2.11), we know that Cicero was deeply impressed by his reading of Lucretius’ 
poem just before he started writing the De republica20. Scholars have long 
speculated about how encountering Lucretius’ poem affected Cicero, and why, 
if he was so impressed by it, he does not mention Lucretius or his poem in the 
De republica or anywhere else in his writings. Scholars have argued that there 
are many passages in the De republica that echo or respond to aspects of 
Lucretius’ poem, and that show he took the challenge it represented very 
seriously. Although we cannot be sure about all of the ways Cicero may have 
designed the De republica to be answer to the De rerum natura, he clearly 
meant his dialogue to be a literary response to it. Given the nature of the De 
republica, and especially its dramatic date and setting, it would not have been 
appropriate or possible for Cicero to mention Lucretius’s poem directly, but 
he made sure that the De republica presented a picture of the world that was 
radically different from the one found in Lucretius.  
On the philosophical level, Cicero worried that members of the Roman 
elite would find the Epicurean view of otium and ataraxia as presented in 
Epicurus and Lucretius especially attractive during times of social unrest, 
when the state needed effective leaders the most. As we saw earlier in the 
passage from the De Oratore (3.63-64), Cicero was clearly worried about what 
would happen if the Epicureans kept up their call to others to retire from 
politics and enjoy a life of leisure in their villas and gardens. As we can see 
from the relevant passages in the De republica, Cicero criticizes the Epicurean 
position on political participation from many different angles. In the prologue 
to Book 1 he argues that nature has endowed humans with a drive for virtue 
and service to others that is much stronger than our desire for pleasure and 
leisure, and that the Epicurean position which argues one should only take 
part in politics when compelled by necessity is completely nonsensical. One 
must take part in politics continuously to be ready when emergencies arise. In 
Book 3, he characterizes the Epicurean view of justice as the closest to the 
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completely immoral view that injustice is better than justice, and he ends the 
work in Book 6 with a biting characterization of the fate of Epicurean souls. 
Finally, on the personal level, Cicero wrote the De republica when he was 
struggling with thoughts that his participation in politics may have come at 
too great a cost, and worrying that his own political career could be 
interpreted as supporting the Epicurean view about the dangers and futility 
of politics. In the prologue of Book 1 of the De republica Cicero talks about 
people21 who point to the misfortunes of Greek and Roman politicians as 
evidence that one should not engage in politics, and who use Cicero’s own 
political and personal misfortunes in their arguments as evidence to show it is 
better not to participate in politics (De republica 1.6): 
 
Nec vero iam meo nomine abstinent, et credo quia nostro consilio ac periculo 
sese in illa vita atque otio conservatos putant, gravius etiam de nobis queruntur 
et amantius.   
 
Nor do they now abstain from invoking my name. And I suppose because 
they think that it was through my deliberations and risk that that they live in a 
state of leisure that they also insistently and lovingly complain about how I have 
been treated. 
 
Cicero goes on in the prologue (especially at 1.8) to argue against the use of 
his own actions and misfortunes as evidence for the truth of the Epicurean 
position, pointing out that his country (patria) has charged him and his fellow 
Romans to come to its aid, and has granted him and others only as much otium as 
is left over after such efforts on behalf of the state.  Cicero thus makes it clear in 
the prologue that he does not want anyone to take him as an example of the cost 
or futility of participating in politics, and the rest of the De republica can be 
viewed as Cicero’s response to those who question the value of political 
participation. The state requires all of its citizens, and especially its most able 
ones, to be actively engaged in helping it. As Cicero made clear in the passage of 
the De Oratore (3.64) discussed earlier, if everyone took the advice of the 
Epicureans and sought their own private pleasure and otium, there would be no 
one to help run the state and protect the otium of all. Cicero, then, saw and 
represented the Epicurean view of politics as a serious threat to the state. If the 
                                                 
21 As Maslowski, “The Chronology of Cicero’s Anti-epicureanism”, cit.: 63-65 points out, 
contemporary Epicureans including Philodemus cited cases of famous leaders who took 
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WALTER ENGLERT 
266 
 
Epicureans were correct, the dialogue De republica would have no purpose, and in 
fact there could be no res publica at all. 
 
 
 
